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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
with the longshoreman problem have gone out of business. Also, in the
years between 1945 and 1954, insurance rates in the industry rose 600 per
cent.8 5 These are but two indications that the shipping industry is not the
horn of plenty that is envisioned by the courts. If America is to effectively
compete with the rising shipping industries in other parts of the world,
policy decisions should now favor the shipowners. Sieracki today stands
on such a slim footing that it, and all that followed are better overruled,
for in light of a decision like Gutierrez the case has grown to unreasonable
proportions. It is submitted that the shipowner's liabilities should not be
so unique, and positive steps should be taken to secure the prosperity
of a valuable enterprise.
Joseph A. Barone
POWER TO COMMENT ON THE ISSUE OF GUILT:
TRIAL BY JURY OR TRIAL BY JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Whether a judge should have the power to comment on the evidence
in his charge to the jury has been a constant source of disagreement among
American legal authorities. Those favoring judicial comment trace the
practice to the English courts, from which our system of trial by jury
was adapted.' Some opinions assert that the constitutional right to a
trial by jury requires that the judge be empowered to comment on the
evidence, since this was an integral part of common law. 2 Because of its
foundation, this view has been known as the common law or orthodox
rule. However, many of the states began to severely limit or entirely
eradicate the power of judicial comment by court decision, statute, or
constitutional provision.3 Moreover, this power was frequently the sub-
ject of proposed federal legislation by a Congress seeking to restrict
the role of federal judges.4 At the present time, only the federal courts
85. See Shields & Byrne, supra note 83, at 1148-50.
1. See Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MicH. L. Rlv. 302,
305 (1915). See also Wright, Instructions to Jury: Summary Without Comment,
1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 177.
2. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288, 289, 50 S.Ct. 253, 254, 255(1930); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-16, 19 S.Ct. 580, 585 (1899).
But see People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931).
3. For a thorough discussion of this process, see Johnson, ProVince of the Judge
in Jury Trials, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc'" 76, 77 (1928). See also Note, 30 MicH. L.
REv. 1303, 1307 & n.11 (1931).
4. See 23 A.B.A.J. 521 (1937).
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and approximately one-fourth of the states5 follow the common law rule,
and even in these jurisdictions the power is limited in varying degrees
despite some eminent authorities who oppose any restriction.6 This com-
ment will examine the common law rule, both in its early history and as it
exists today, in an effort to ascertain when, and if, an expression by the trial
judge in his charge to the jury as to his belief in the guilt of a defendant in
a criminal case falls within the permissible area of judicial comment.
II.
JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE IN GENERAL
Before discussing any specific aspect of the power to "comment on
the evidence," the phrase itself must be analyzed. It does not concern the
judge's power to review and summarize the evidence in his charge.7 There
is little dispute that the judge should at least be permitted, if not obliged,
to perform this function. But rather, commenting on the evidence entails
commenting on the weight of the evidence, which in turn includes express-
ing an opinion thereon. This is further classified into expressions of opinion
on the credibility of a particular witness, and as to how some particular
factual issue should be resolved," including the ultimate issue in a case.9
The controversy over the power focuses mainly on the latter category, to
which this discussion is limited.
The opponents of the common law rule vigorously object that any
expression of opinion by the trial judge on a factual issue invades the
province of the jury, and will be unduly influential in the jury's determi-
nation.'0 This is especially true when the judge expresses his opinion on
the ultimate issue, and not merely on the general weight of the evidence
or on a specific factual issue." However, the proponents of the rule point
out that where the judge has been given the power to express an opinion
on the facts, it has been carefully exercised, and furthermore any attempt
to deny the jury the benefit of the court's opinion will reduce the role of
the judge to that of a mere umpire. 12 Somewhere between these diverse
lines of argument lies the real value of judicial comment, wherein the judge
5. The states allowing some degree of judicial comment today are California,
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont.
For a classification of all the states according to liberality in allowing the general
power of judicial comment, see Wright, Instructions to Jury Without Comment, 1954
WASH. U.L.Q. 177.
6. Dean Wigmore maintains that the "tendency [to restrict the exercise of the
power] is lamentable." 9 WIGmORt, EvnNacg § 2551 (3d ed. 1940).
7. See Otis, Comment to the Jury by the Trial Judge, 21 ORx. L. Rv. 1, 3 (1941).
8. The narrow meaning of comment on the evidence is limited to expressing an
opinion on factual issues. Id. at 8.
9. See Weissberger, The Right of the Trial Judge in Federal Courts To Comment
on the Evidence, 5 BROOKLYN L. Riv. 272, 276 (1936).
10. See Otis, supra note 7, at 4.
11. See Fryer v. United States, 11 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1926), where the court
distinguished an opinion on an ultimate issue determinative of guilt and an opinion
on guilt itself.
12. See Otis, supra note 7, at 9.
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may give the jury the benefit of his knowledge and experience, without
unduly influencing their verdict by direction or coercion.' 3 Accordingly,
several limitations on the power arose, within which the judge could express
his opinion as to the facts. Any expression of opinion must be non-
argumentative, dispassionate and couched in judicial language.14 Being
thus limited in the tone of his charge, the judge is prohibited from per-
suading or coercing the jury by his expression of opinion. Secondly, the
ultimate determination of any fact issue must be clearly left to the jury.15
The above limitations have also been applied in criminal cases. The
United States Supreme Court announced at an early date that the power
to express an opinion on the facts encompassed an opinion as to the judge's
personal belief in the guilt of the accused, and this is not reviewable on
appeal if matters of fact are ultimately left to the jury.16 But it can be
argued that the judge should be prohibited entirely from comment on the
criminal guilt of a defendant, since he is prohibited from directing a verdict
of guilty.' 7 But by indicating his belief that the defendant is guilty, tle
judge has in effect told the jury that he is of the opinion that the prosecu-
tion has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is difficult to
see how the jury can lightly regard this statement.'8 If the jury is unduly
influenced, or the court has substituted its opinion for that of the jury, a
verdict of guilty has in effect been directed. 19 This factor has influenced
many courts in jurisdictions following the orthodox rule to severely limit




Many Supreme Court decisions gave effect to the common law rule,
but the majority of these involved civil cases.20 In the few criminal cases
13. See Walker, Judicial Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials, 15 A.B.A.J.
647 (1929).
14. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 14 S.Ct. 919 (1894). However, when it
is apparent that doubt exists in the minds of the jury, the judge is subject to the
further limitation that he may not express an opinion after his main charge. Thus
where the judge urged the jury that they should have no difficulty in reaching a
verdict when they had returned for additional instructions, this was coercion on the
part of the judge. Boyett v. United States, 48 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1931). This is
especially true when the jury is in apparent deadlock. Garst v. United States, 180
Fed. 339 (4th Cir. 1910).
15. See Walker, supra note 13, at 647.
16. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 14 S.Ct. 919 (1894).
17. The court may not direct a verdict of guilty even when the facts are undis-
puted. United States v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 470 (C.C.D. Kan. 1882).
18. The jury gives great weight to the judge's lightest word. Hicks v. United
States, 150 U.S. 442, 452, 14 S.Ct. 144, 147 (1893).
19. What the judge may not do directly he may not do by indirection. Peterson v.
United States 213 Fed 920 (9th Cir. 1914). See also Horning v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 53 (1920) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis).
20. Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U.S. 85, 8 S.Ct. 1142 (1888) ; United States v. Phila-
delphia & R. R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 8 S.Ct. 77 (1887); St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v.
Vickers, 122 U.S. 360, 7 S.Ct. 1216 (1887); Vicksburg & M. R.R. v. Putnam,
118 U.S. 545, 7 S.Ct. 1 (1886).
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in which the rule was mentioned, the Court was not dealing with a direct
expression in the charge of belief in the defendant's guilt.2' In the lower
federal courts, however, the rule had been applied to sustain instructions
where such an expression of opinion was directly involved, and was sub-
jected only to the limitations generally imposed on the common law power.
In Dillon v. United States,22 the district judge ventured his opinion that
the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. 28 This was upheld in the
circuit court under the "well-established rule" which permitted such ex-
pression of opinion provided the jury is "given unequivocally to understand
that it is not bound by the expressed opinion of the judge."24
The Dillon case typifies the trend in the federal courts during the
first quarter of the century to include the power to express an opinion on
the guilt of the defendant within the general power to comment on the
evidence. Nonetheless, in two cases the courts expressed disapproval of
this trend, but felt the expression of opinion was not reversible error. In
Endleman v. United States,25 the trial judge in the Ninth Circuit had
included in his charge to the jury the statement "I do not see any way
that these defendants can be acquitted. ' 26 After criticizing this language,
the circuit court felt compelled to allow the charge under the authority of
prior Supreme Court decisions, since "no rule of law was incorrectly
stated," and the fact questions were ultimately left to the determination of
the jury.27 In Breese v. United States, 28 the Fourth Circuit Court made
this statement :
While this court does not approve of certain expressions in the
charge, wherein the trial judge stated that, in his opinion, the defen-
dant could not escape conviction; that viewing the evidence as the court
did, the defendant was guilty, and it was the duty of the jury to say
so, - yet qualified ... by the caution . .. that the jury was not ...
governed by the opinion of the court, we cannot say that such expres-
sions constitute reversible error. 29
In 1920, the Supreme Court dealt squarely with the permissibility of
an expression of opinion on the issue of guilt in Horning v. District of
Columbia,30 and upheld, by a slim majority, a strong expression of belief
21. See Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 15 S.Ct. 36 (1894) (court pro-
pounded questions indicating belief in defendant's guilt) ; Starr v. United States, 153
U.S. 614, 14 S.Ct. 919 (1894) (judge overly dramatic in stating evidence) ; Simmons
v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 12 S.Ct. 171 (1891) (expression made in decliningjury's request to be discharged).
22. 279 Fed. 639 (2d Cir. 1921).
23. Id. at 642.
24. Id. at 643.
25. 86 Fed. 456 (9th Cir. 1898).
26. Id. at 462.
27. Ibid.
28. 106 Fed. 680 (4th Cir. 1901), re7/d on other grounds, 108 Fed. 804 (4th
Cir. 1901).
29. Id. at 686.
30. 254 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 53 (1920).
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in defendant's guilt by the lower court judge.3 ' Refuting the objection
that the lower court had directed a verdict of guilty,3 2 Mr. Justice Holmes
reasoned that since all the facts were admitted, the function of the jury
was "little more than formal," and the strong expression of opinion on the
defendant's guilt by the judge was warranted.83 Therefore, when the facts
were uncontroverted, even the strongest expressions as to guilt were
allowable. 34 Conversely, the tendency was to limit such cases in which
expression of belief in the guilt of the accused was permissible within the
scope of the Horning decision. 5 The decisions after that case still noted
disapproval of the rule, but recognized that where there were no disputed
facts, the danger of invading the province of the jury was "purely formal."3 6
B. After 1933
In 1933, in United States v. Murdock,37 the Supreme Court was
again faced with a clear expression of opinion by the judge that the defen-
dant was guilty. The charge to the jury had included the statement that
the "Court feels . . . the government . . . has proved that this defendant
is guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt." 38 The circuit court reversed,
admitting the power of the court to express an opinion as to the guilt of
the accused, but maintaining that this power be severely limited.3 9 The
Supreme Court affirmed, limiting the power to express an opinion on the
guilt issue to "exceptional cases."' 40 The power was thus to be held
greatly in check.
41
31. The lower court judge had said: "I will say that a failure to bring in a
verdict in this case can arise only from a willful and flagrant disregard of the evidence
and the law as I have given it to you and a violation of your obligation as jurors...
I cannot tell you in so many words to find the defendant guilty, but what I say
amounts to that." Id. at 140, 41 S.Ct. at 54-55.
32. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis contains a strong assertion
that the charge had amounted to a direction to find the defendant guilty. Id. at 139,
140, 41 S.Ct. at 54, 55.
33. Id. at 138, 41 S.Ct. at 54.
34. See United States v. Notto, 61 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1932); Fryer v. United
States, 11 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1926) ; Carney v. United States, 295 Fed. 606 (9th Cir.
1924); Robinson v. United States, 290 Fed. 755 (2d Cir. 1923); United States v.
Siden, 293 Fed. 422 (D.C. Minn. 1923).
35. See Carney v. United States, 295 Fed. 606 (9th Cir. 1924); Robinson v.
United States, 290 Fed. 755 (2d Cir. 1923); United States v. Siden, 293 Fed. 422
(D.C. Minn. 1923).
36. See United States v. Notto, 61 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1932); Fryer v. United
States, 11 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1926).
37. 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
38. Id. at 393, 54 S.Ct. at 225.
39. "[T]he trial court has an important duty to perform in assisting the jury to
arrive at a true verdict . . . [but] there is . . considerable danger of the court's
substituting its opinion for that of the jury. . . . It would seem the better practice
to comment upon the character of the evidence and, if and when an opinion is
expressed, to limit it to a basic fact or an issue involved, upon which the guilt of
accused is in part dependent. By so doing, the jury is left to perform its constitutional
duty of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, and at the same time, the
court fully meets its very important duty of assisting the jury in reaching an intelli-
gent verdict." Murdock v. United States, 62 F.2d 926, 927 (1932).
40. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394, 54 S.Ct. 223, 225 (1933).
41. United States v. Brown, 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1935).
[VOL. 9
5
Schilpp: Power to Comment on the Issue of Guilt: Trial by Jury or Trial by
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964
SPRING 1964]
In Hartzell v. United States,42 where the judge had stated his opinion
that the government had established facts which should convince men of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reiterated the
proposition that where the facts are undisputed the power to express
opinion remains. 43 But, where the facts are in dispute, cases have con-
sistently held that the Murdock decision has prohibited comment.4 4 This
is fully expressed in Meltzer v. United States4 5 which interpreted the
limitations on the power after the Murdock and Horning decisions to be
threefold: (1) the judge may advise and persuade, but may not command
or coerce; (2) discretion to be exercised by the judge is limited by the
standards of his high office, and (3) exceptional circumstances existing
in the case, which condition could not be present where the facts are in
dispute.46 The facts are "in dispute" where the defendant introduces no
evidence47 or where he testifies to even the most implausible story.48
Although the Murdock case had seemingly allowed comment in the
"undisputed fact" area, the trend has been to further the Horning rationale.
The Second Circuit has been most restrictive, but other circuits have also
followed in that direction.4" The 1958 case of United States v. Woods °
emphasizes this trend by again questioning the "well-established rule," as
quoted in the Dillon case. The trial judge had expressed the opinion that
the defendant was guilty as charged. In reversing, the court distinguished
between expressing an opinion as to the credibility of a witness and an
opinion on guilt: the latter is far more prejudicial since in doing so the
judge says that not only are all the commonwealth witnesses telling the
truth, but also that their testimony constitutes evidence of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.5 1
42. 72 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1934).
43. Id. at 586. See also Bennett v. United States, 252 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1958).
But in a concurring opinion in another case it was thought that any comment on guilt
is a violation of the sixth amendment. United States v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d 739, 748(7th Cir. 1938).
44. See United States v. Woods, 252 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. United
States, 227 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Meltzer, 100 F.2d 739 (7th
Cir. 1938). The clearest example of this proposition can be found in Billeci v. United
States, in which the trial judge had quoted verbatim the instruction involved in
Horning, but was held to have urged his view on the jury since an expression of
opinion on the guilt issue where the facts are in dispute invades the constitutional
line between judge and jury. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
45. 100 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1938). This case, although dealing with an expression
of opinion concerning credibility of witnesses, contains an enlightening discussion of
the scope and purpose of judicial comment. It also lists in exhaustive detail all the
circuit court decisions before United States v. Murdock which held squarely that the
judge may comment on the guilt of the accused. Id. at 743 n.1.
46. Id. at 746.
47. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
48. McBride v. United States, 314 F.2d 75, 77 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Davis v. United
States, 227 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1955).
49. McBride v. United States, 314 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1963); Sadler v. United
States, 303 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1962) (indicates that if judge had made an
expression as to guilt, he would be reversed); United States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1953).
50. 252 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1958).
51. Id. at 336.
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Although the federal courts unquestionably still follow the general
orthodox common law power to comment, there have been many sentiments
expressed in the circuit court decisions that an expression of opinion on
the guilt issue is not within the power. The Supreme Court has not gone
this far. But in Murdock they have strictly limited the rule and have left
interpretation of the "exceptional circumstances" rule to the lower courts.
Because of the great risk of undue influence by the judge in this area, most
of these courts have interpreted Murdock so narrowly as to make any
permissible expression on guilt a distinct rarity.
IV.
STATE COURTS
Less than ten states adhere to the orthodox rule as it exists in the
federal courts while other jurisdictions allow judicial comment to some
extent. For purposes of analysis, the states will be divided into two main
classifications: those that do and those that do not purport to follow the
orthodox rule as it existed at common law. The former category is further
subdivided according to liberality in allowing expression of opinion on the
issue of guilt, and the latter jurisdictions will be summarily examined to
determine if such expression is permitted.
A. Orthodox Rule Jurisdictions
1. Most Liberal
(a) Pennsylvania. This jurisdiction clearly allows the court to ex-
press an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant if there are reasonable
grounds for such a statement, and the court clearly leaves the jury free to
decide the issue regardless of this opinion.52 In addition, any opinion must
be fair and temperate to avoid coercion of the jury.5 3 This rule has
prevailed and has been consistently upheld in both the superior and supreme
court of the state.5 4
It appears, however, that the rule evolved from early cases in which
the court was not dealing with an opinion directed solely at the guilt issue,
but was concerned with an expression of opinion as to the degree of guilt,55
52. LAuB, PXNNSYLVANIA TRIAL Gums § 201 (1959).
53. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Simmons,
361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949); Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 325 Pa. 63, 68, 188
At. 752, 754, 755 (1937); Commonwealth v. Watson, 117 Pa. Super. 594, 178 Atl.
408 (1935).
54. Recent applications of the rule can be found in Commonwealth v. Raymond,
412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963) ; Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d
293 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Lomax, 196 Pa. Super. 5, 173 A.2d 710 (1961). In the
Cisneros and Raymond cases, the charge to the jury had included the judge's statement
that a verdict of not guilty would be a miscarriage of justice, and this was held to be
allowable within the orthodox rule.
55. Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A.2d 290 (1955); Commonwealth
v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949); Commonwealth v. Weston, 297 Pa. 382,
446 [VOL. 9
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and the fixing of a penalty.56 These cases are not convincing authority
that an opinion on the issue of guilt is within the orthodox rule. Also,
when faced with a direct judicial expression of guilt, the courts have shown
an indication to treat such opinion as an opinion on the weight of the
evidence alone. 57 In Johnson v. Commonwealth55 and Johnston v. Com-
monwealth,59 the rule that the judge may express his opinion as to the
guilt of the defendant was applied in upholding strong expressions by the
court that the evidence clearly warranted the conviction of the defendant.
However, the opinions ventured by the judges in both cases were directed
to the weight of the evidence6 0 - a practice clearly within the orthodox
rule61 - and only by innuendo indicated a belief in the defendant's guilt.
Only in dissenting opinions and in dicta has the orthodox rule been
attacked. In Commonwealth v. Gross,6 2 Justice Keller believed that the
judge's charge, to the effect that the jury should have no trouble in finding
defendant guilty, exceeded the common law power; a judge should have
no right to tell the jury what its verdict ought to be, since such an opinion
goes to the whole case, both fact and law.6 3 The modern opponent of the
rule is Justice Musmanno, who dissented in both Commonwealth v.
Cisneros64 and Commonwealth v. Raymond.65 In the Cisneros case he
stated: "so long as we have trial by jury it is the jury which decides guilt
or innocence not the judge. If the evidence was so overwhelmingly in
favor of the prosecution, why was it necessary to bludgeon the jury into
a verdict of guilty? Could he not assume that the jury itself would see
what apparently he [the judge] saw so vividly?"66 It is true that these
dissents object mainly that the expressions of opinion involved were not
fair and temperate, and thus admit the basic premise that the judge has
387, 147 Atl. 79, 81 (1929); Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 Ati. 486(1924); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 282 Pa. 128, 135, 127 Atl. 465, 467 (1925);
Commonwealth v. McClain, 110 Pa. 263, 1 Atl. 45 (1885).
56. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 Atl. 20 (1935); Commonwealth
v. Nafus, 303 Pa. .418, 420, 154 Atl. 485, 486 (1931).
57. Commonwealth v. Scott, 38 Pa. Super. 303 (1909). The charge to the jury
was as follows:
•... it is the opinion of the court that this defendant did not exercise such
care and caution as he ought to have done in the premises, and that he, therefore,
is guilty of neglect of duty. 38 Pa. Super. at 304.
The appellate court dealt with this as an expression on the weight of the evidence.
58. 115 Pa. 369, 9 Atl. 78 (1887).
59. 85 Pa. 54 (1877).
60. In the Johnson case, the charge contained the statement that "the evidence of
the Commonwealth ... seems to point to this defendant as the murderer . . ." 115 Pa.
at 396, 9 Atl. at 82, and the Supreme Court pointed out that this statement was clearly
warranted by the evidence. In the Johnston case, the court construed a similar charge
as a statement that if the jury believed the evidence, it seemed that they should convict.
85 Pa. at 65. The theory behind both decisions was that. since the evidence against
the defendant was overwhelming and uncontradicted, no harm was done to the defen-
dant as long as the ultimate determination of his guilt was left to the jury.
61. Commonwealth v. Orr, 138 Pa. 276, 20 Atl. 866 (1890). See generally SADLjR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 572 (2d ed. 1937).
62. 89 Pa. Super. 387 (1926).
63. Id. at 391 (dissenting opinion).
64. 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955).
65. 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963).
66. 381 Pa. 447, 458, 113 A.2d 293, 299 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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the right to advance his opinion on the guilt issue. However, the probability
that this opinion will be given undue weight by the jury is clearly recog-
nized. Because of the lack of precedent dealing directly with judicial
opinion of guilt, the dissenting view might influence the court to eventually
deny this power to the judge.6 7
(b) New Jersey. This state gives the judge power to express an
opinion freely on the evidence, and the inferences he would draw from it.6s
The only limitation is that issues of fact must ultimately be left to the
jury. Few cases have dealt squarely with the question of whether this
power includes an opinion on the guilt issue, but an affirmative answer
would seem inevitable since the judge has the right to use language which
indicates the impression made upon his mind by the evidence.6 9 In State
v. Giampetro,70 the rule allowing judicial comment was cited to support
an instruction that the evidence led to the conclusion that the defendant
had committed the crime charged; although this statement was strictly
concerned with the weight to be afforded the evidence, it closely approached
a belief of guilt.
The trend to include the guilt issue within the area of permissible
expression of opinion has been supported by a long line of decisions.7 1
By way of contrast, the courts seem more reluctant to allow comment on
the ultimate issue in civil cases. In Morie v. New Jersey Mfg. Co. 7 2
the court stated that an expression of opinion on the ultimate issue con-
stitutes an unfair interference with the jury verdict, because of the great
influence of the judge's opinion.7 3 The criminal cases have given no
indication that they will go this far.7
4
(c) California. California originally was very restrictive in allowing
the judge power to comment, and incorporated this restrictive attitude into
its constitution.7 5 However, in 1934 the constitution was amended to allow
greater freedom of comment, and the state is now one of the jurisdictions
according considerable leeway to the judge.76 The cases decided under the
1934 constitutional amendment indicate that an expression of belief in
67. See brief for petitioner in Commonwealth v. Wright, argued before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, April 29, 1964.
68. See State v. Corrado, 113 N.J.L. 53, 172 Atl. 571 (1934) ; State v. Dragone,
99 N.J.L. 144, 122 At. 878 (1923); State v. Randall, 95 N.J.L. 452, 113 Atd. 231(1921) ; State v. Harrington, 87 N.J.L. 713, 94 Atl. 623 (1915); State v. Overton,
85 N.J.L. 287, 88 At. 689 (1913) ; State v. Pulley, 82 N.J.L. 579, 82 Atl. 857 (1912)
State v. Hummer, 73 N.J.L. 714, 65 Atl. 249 (1906).
69. State v. Dragone, 99 N.J.L. 144, 122 Atl. 878 (1923).
70. 107 N.J.L. 120, 150 Atd. 367 (1930).
71. Supra, note 68.
72. 48 N.J. Super. 70, 137 A.2d 41 (1957). In this case the ultimate issue was
whether an explosion had occurred within the meaning of an insurance policy, and the
trial judge had said "I personally think there was an explosion." The appellate court
held that this exceeded the bounds of fair comment.
73. Id. at 82, 137 A.2d at 48.
74. The New Jersey Superior Court has gone this far when dealing with the
question of the judge indicating a belief in defendant's guilt while partaking in an
examination of witnesses. State v. Riley, 49 N.J. Super. 570, 140 A.2d 543 (1958).
75. C.. CONST. art. VI, § 17 (1879).
76. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1954). See People v. Busby, 40 Cal. App. 2d 193,
104 P.2d 531 (1940).
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guilt is permissible when the common law limitations on the power are
observed. 7 These limitations are designed to safeguard the right of the
jury to decide issues of fact and protect the rights of the defendant.
Therefore, any comment must be temperately and fairly made, and involve
the exercise of judicial caution to avoid advocacy.78 Thus an expression
of belief in guilt has been held coercive where the judge offered his opinion
not in his charge, but only when it appeared the jury might be deadlocked.7 9
Generally, however, opinions on the guilt issue have been freely allowed,
since "guilt must always depend on evidence, and the judge may comment
on the evidence."80
(d) Connecticut. Since 1918, the power of a judge to comment on the
evidence has been governed by statutory provisions, granting the judge
the privilege to submit fact questions to the jury "with such observations
on the evidence for their information as it may think proper." 8' The
purpose of the statute was to restore trial by jury to its common law form. 2
This section applied to criminal as well as civil cases.8 3 Although the only
limitations on the judge under this section are that the judge may not
direct, advise, or attempt to control the verdict of the jury,8 4 it has been
argued that the better course is for the judge to refrain from expressing
himself on the issue of guilt.8,5 But the statutory provision and the decisions
interpreting it seem clearly broad enough to cover an expression of opinion
of guilty, and no case has been found denying the existence of that power.
2. Restrictive8
(a) New York. The power to express a view on the guilt of the
accused was generally upheld in older New York cases,8 7 subject only to
the standard limitations imposed by common law. In People v. Fisher8
the court stated that only where the evidence of bias is marked, and the
balance of proof is only slightly in favor of guilt would such an expression
77. See People v. Friend, 50 Cal. 2d 570, 327 P.2d 97 (1958) ; People v. Huff,
134 Cal. App. 2d 182, 285 P.2d 17 (1955) ; People v. Eudy, 12 Cal. 2d 41, 82 P.2d 359(1938); People v. Patubo, 9 Cal. 2d 537, 71 P.2d 270 (1937); People v. Ottey, 5
Cal. 2d 714, 56 P.2d 193 (1936).
78. Ibid.
79. People v. Crowley, 101 Cal. App. 2d 71, 224 P.2d 748 (1950); People v.
Walker, 93 Cal. App. 2d 818, 209 P.2d 834 (1949).
80. People v. Friend, 50 Cal. 2d 570, 578, 327 P.2d 97, 104 (1958) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Schauer).
81. CONN. GiN. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 216 (1949).
82. State v. Gannon, 75 Conn. 206, 52 At. 727 (1902). For a concise discussion
of this statute see Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 12 J. Am. JuD.
Soc'Y 76, 78 (1928).
83. State v. Cianflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 Atl. 347 (1923).84. State v. Pinagglia, 99 Conn. 242, 121 Atl. 473 (1923) (judge can't direct,
advise or attempt to control verdict) ; State v. Cabaudo, 83 Conn. 160, 76 Atl. 42 (1910)(judge can't advise jury how to decide case) ; State v. Marx, 98 Conn. 18, 60 Atl. 690(1905) (greater care to avoid advising should be used in serious criminal cases).
85. Coy v. Town of Milford, 126 Conn. 484, 12 A.2d 641 (1940).
86. These jurisdictions adhere to the orthodox rule, but have greatly limited the
situations in which a judge may express his belief in the guilt of the defendant.
87. See generally Note 9, N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rzv. 201, 205 (1954); Note, 2
BROOKLYN L. Rsv. 273 (1933).
88. 136 App. Div. 57, 120 N.Y. Supp. 659 (1909).
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constitute reversible error. However, the trend shifted. In People v.
Kohn,89 the appellate court held the trial court's instruction to be error
where the judge indicated that the "inference of guilt was irrestible." 90 This
amounted to an invasion of the province of the jury which "leaving it up
to them" could not cure. Also in People v. Carlsonakas,91 although not
reversing the jury verdict, the appellate court made the statement that the
judge must state the law, but is not permitted directly or indirectly to
express an opinion to the jury. This view followed what had been said to
be the general rule: in New York the judge should not have thrown his
personal conviction into the scales by which defendant's guilt is to be
weighed, and the jury should feel free to determine the questions sub-
mitted, without indication on the part of the court as to its conviction of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.92 Whenever an expression of belief
in defendant's guilt is directly involved, the courts seem willing to accept
this "general rule" allowing the judge to comment on the evidence, but
without expressing an opinion on the guilt issue.9 3 Thus the judge may
marshal the evidence so as to indicate his belief, but may not expressly
give his opinion.
(b) Michigan. The power to comment on a factual issue was restricted,
by statute in Michigan in 1915.94 In 1929, however, the judge was given
power to comment on the testimony, and the earlier statute was repealed.9 5
Despite these statutory provisions, Case law has produced its own limita-
tions on the power. Before 1929 the cases appear confused as to whether
a judge could express an opinion that a defendant was guilty. Those that
argued that the judge could express his opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused felt that such power was a corollary to the accepted rule
that the judge may under proper circumstances, whenever he thinks it
will assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion, express his opinion
on any question of fact he submits to the jury; at least this is true when
no factual dispute is raised.96 Another line of cases maintained that the
trial judge is excluded from intimating to the jury his views as to how
they should decide a fact issue.9 7 After the 1929 statute, however, strict
limitations were imposed. The court in People v. Padgett" removed from
the scope of the 1929 statute any expression of what the judge thinks the
89. 251 N.Y. 375, 167 N.E. 505 (1929).
90. Id. at 370, 167 N.E. at 506.
91. 241 App. Div. 232, 272 N.Y. Supp. 35 (1934).
92. People v. Kilroe, 201 App. Div. 549, 194 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1922).
93. See People v. Spitzer, 295 N.Y. 5 (1944) (per curiam) ; People v. De Martine,
205 App. Div. 80, 199 N.Y. Supp. 426 (1923). See generally 9 WIGMoRa, EVIDXNCE
§ 2551 (3d ed. 1940). The rule was mentioned in other cases where the court con-
strued the charge as not indicating an expression of opinion on guilt. People v.
Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915); Henze v. People, 82 N.Y. 611 (1880).
94. Mich. Pub. Acts 1915, No. 314, § 27.1038.
95. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1052 (1954).
96. People v. Murphy, 239 Mich. 60, 214 N.W. 165 (1927); People v. Heikkala,
226 Mich. 332, 197 N.W. 366 (1924) (dictum).
97. People v. Lintz, 244 Mich. 603, 222 N.W. 201 (1928); People v. Durham,
170 Mich. 598, 136 N.W. 431 (1912).
98. People v. Padgett, 306 Mich. 545, 11 N.W.2d 235 (1943).
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jury verdict should be. The case has been interpreted as bringing the scope
of expression of opinion on the guilt issue within the limits of the federal
rule, as dictated by the Murdock decision.99 This is evidenced by recent
decisions reversing the instruction on the grounds that it exceeded the
bounds of fair comment.100
B. Jurisdictions Allowing Limited Judicial Comment
Few jurisdictions which do not adhere strictly to the orthodox rule
indicate that an expression of opinion on the ultimate issue of guilt is
allowable. However, New Mexico and Vermont constitute exceptions.
In the leading case of State v. Ochoa,101 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the 1934 trial court rule allowing comment encompassed a fair
expression of opinion. Although this case dealt with the credibility of
witnesses it clearly announces the intention to test any expression of
opinion by the limits imposed by the federal courts. This same rule prevails
in Vermont, where the expression will be permitted as long as the judge
leaves final determination to the jury. 0 2
The strongest indication that no opinion on the ultimate issue is
permissible is found in Utah, where it has been held that the constitutional
right to trial by jury is invaded if the judge indicates that any of the facts
which constitute the crime charged are established. 10 3 This rule has been
applied to prohibit as unfair comment any opinion on the facts, and would
thus be a bar to an opinion on the guilt issue.10 4
Rhode Island also adopts a strict view, allowing the judge to state the
evidence bearing on the issues and to refer to the evidence, if he does so
fairly.'0 " However, the judge is prohibited from expressing his own view
as to the facts' 0 6 or his impression as to the weight of the testimony. 10 7
The rule is most clearly stated in a civil case; Pompei v. Casetta,10 s where
the Supreme Court stated that the trial judge may only mention the
evidence to explain the law, and should not give opinions on the evidence;
if he does give such an opinion, he should not do it in his charge to the
jury. Under this reasoning, in a criminal case, it would seem no expression
of belief in defendant's guilt would be permissible. In State v. Harris,0 9
99. See also People v. Lintz, 244 Mich. 603, 222 N.W. 201 (1928).
100. People v. Oates, 369 Mich. 214, 119 N.W.2d 530 (1963) ; People v. Barmore,
368 Mich. 26, 117 N.W.2d 186 (1962).
101. 41 N.M. 589, 72 P.2d 609 (1937).
102. State v. Manati, 109 Vt. 429, 199 Att. 249 (1938).
103. State v. Estrada, 227 P.2d 247 (Utah, 1951) ; State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
6 P.2d 177 (1931).
104. See State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951) ; State v. Peterson,
110 Utah 413, 174 P.2d 843 (1946); State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178(1943). The dissenting opinion of Justice Wolfe in State v. Lawrence contains a
seemingly unheeded plea to follow the orthodox rule and allow the judge to advise
the jury in an impartial way in a proper case. 120 Utah at 326, 234 P.2d at 604, 606.
105. State v. Gallogly, 47 R.I. 483, 134 AtI. 20, 21 (1926).
106. State v. Fish, 49 R.I. 397, 143 Atl. 604, 607 (1928).
107. State v. Gallogly, 47 R.I. 483, 134 Atl. 20 (1926).
108. 63 R.I. 74, 7 A.2d 198 (1939). See also McCreadie v. Billtcliffe, 80 R.I. 232,
95 A.2d 458, 459 (1953) ; State v. Smith, 70 R.I. 500, 41 A.2d 153, 160 (1945).
109. 89 R.I. 202, 152 A.2d 106, 110-11 (1959).
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the judge's charge was to the effect that the defendant had killed his
own mother, and although the issue was ultimately left to the jury, the
appellate court felt that it was improper for the judge to suggest to the
jury "a definite resolution of this contested issue of fact."
Statutes have played an important role in two other states. In Massa-
chusetts an expression on guilt is clearly not allowed, despite the repeal
of their restrictive statute." 0 Dean Wigmore makes reference to Massa-
chusetts as an example of a state which has adopted a compromise rule
which allows the judge to rehearse and state the testimony, but not charge
the jury by expressing an opinion on the main issue."' For this contention
he cites Hohman v. Henrmen,"2 a civil case, and though some feel that
this case reinstated the common law power, there is no indication that
prior law allowed an expression of guilt. In Maine the restrictive statute
has had little effect, as the courts continued to construe the statute as
allowing the common law power." 3 But the direct wording of the statute
seems clearly to prohibit an expression of opinion on the issue of guilt,
though no case has gone this far.
V.
CONCLUSION
The power to express an opinion on the guilt issue has been distin-
guished from other aspects of the common law power to comment on the
evidence." 4 It is in effect a statement that the prosecution has proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of the danger that any opinion
bearing such import might be given undue weight by the jury, the Supreme
Court has specifically limited the situation in which such comment is
permissible to cases in which no factual dispute is presented." 5 But, some
states, notably Pennsylvania, California, Connecticut, and New Jersey,
have ignored the policy of the Murdock decision and allowed comment on
the guilt issue as long as such comment is "fair and temperate."" 6 Limiting
permissible comment within the confines of Murdock is the better course,
and is more in keeping with the historically accepted conceptual function
of the jury.
Thomas F. Schilpp
110. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 81 (1956).
111. 9 WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2551 (3d ed. 1940).
112. 280 Mass. 526, 182 N.E. 850 (1932).
113. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 16 A.2d 103 (1940) ; State v. Means,
95 Me. 359, 50 AtI. 30 (1901).
114. United States v. Woods, 252 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1958) (distinguished from
expressing an opinion on credibility) ; Fryer v. United States, 11 F.2d 707 (7th Cir.
1926) (distinguished from expressing opinion on ultimate issue).
115. See United States v. Murdock, '290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
116. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963).
Clearly, since the facts were in dispute, this was not an "exceptional" case as con-
templated by the federal courts; Pennsylvania has thus retained the orthodox rule
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